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Not in My Backyard: A Critique of
Current Indiana Law on Land Use
Moratoria
THADDEUS R. AILES*
INTRODUCTION
In three recent cases,' a federal district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that under Indiana law, a temporary moratorium placed on building
permits by a local government is actually a zoning ordinance and therefore is
invalid unless it satisfies the statutory requirements for enacting a zoning
ordinance. In each of the three cases, a local government had enacted a temporary
moratorium on building permits in an attempt to preserve the status quo (i.e.,
prevent an undesired land use from coming into the community) while the local
government proceeded through the steps required by Indiana statutory law for
enacting a zoning ordinance. In all three of the cases, the federal courts struck
down the moratoria, holding that the moratoria were invalid because the local
governments did not enact them in accordance with the steps laid out by Indiana
statute for enacting a zoning ordinance. The result was that the counties were
forced by the courts to grant permits to the plaintiff developers and allow land
uses which the counties did not want and were in the process of legislating
against.2 In the first case, Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners,3 Jay County
tried unsuccessfully to keep the plaintiff, Pro-Eco, from putting a landfill in the
county. In the second case, Triple G Landfills, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners,4
Fountain County tried unsuccessfully to prevent Triple G Landfills, Inc. ("Triple
G") from putting a landfill in the county. The third case, Sagamore Park v. City
of Indianapolis,5 involved an off-track betting facility which the local
government did not want in the particular location where the plaintiff wanted to
put it.
Due to the courts' decisions in these three cases, Indiana municipalities 6 are
now unable to refuse to grant a building or improvement permit to a developer
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1994,
Butler University. I thank Professor Jeffrey E. Stake for his helpful comments and suggestions,
and Thomas A. Jensen, Richard S. Pitts, Cedric Hustace, and Rosemary G. Spalding, attorneys
who worked on the three main cases discussed in this Note, for helping me begin my research.
1. Although there were just three cases, there were actually five decisions: three at the
district court level and two on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
2. For a more complete discussion of the facts in each of the three cases, see infra part I.B.
3. 776 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 57 F.3d
505 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of further relief on subsequent appeal), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 672 (1995).
4. 774 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
5. 885 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
6. Because the local government entities which issue moratoria are sometimes counties,
sometimes towns, and sometimes cities, this Note will often use the general term
"municipalities" to include all three possibilities.
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unless the municipality has already gone through the very time-consuming
comprehensive planning and zoning process and legislated against the particular
land use before the developer applies for the permit. This rule expects an
unrealistic amount of foresight on the part of local governments, as the local
government officials might not even consider the possibility of a particular land
use in their community until someone actually applies for a permit for that use.7
It is also likely that, according to these three cases, many moratoria in Indiana
have been instituted by local governments illegally! Thus, it may just be a matter
of time before many more Indiana counties are sued by developers who have
been denied permits.
This Note will make two basic arguments. First, as a technical matter, a
temporary moratorium such as the defendants in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and
Sagamore Park used is not a zoning ordinance and should therefore not be
treated as such by the courts. Second, as a practical matter, municipalities should
not be handcuffed when dealing with uses of land which they just had not
contemplated. In other words, a community should not have to be burdened
forever with an undesired land use just because the local government did not
have time to go through the lengthy process of enacting a comprehensive plan
and zoning ordinance before the developer applied for a building permit. The
local government should be able to preserve the status quo while it goes through
the procedures which Indiana statutory law requires for the enactment of a
zoning ordinance. Only if municipalities have this ability will they be able to
effectively determine just what gets put in their backyards.
Part I of this Note will provide background information necessary for
understanding the issues which will be discussed. This information will include
a discussion of the requirements of comprehensive planning and zoning and
factual summaries of the three main cases which are the subject of this Note. Part
II will discuss the benefits of allowing municipalities to use temporary moratoria
to preserve the status quo while going through the planning and zoning
processes. Part III will make the argument that a temporary moratorium is not a
zoning ordinance and should therefore not have to satisfy the statutory
requirements which a zoning ordinance must satisfy. Part IV will discuss the
source of an Indiana municipality's authority to enact a temporary moratorium.
Part V will discuss the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,9 a Takings Clause case,
on the use of temporary moratoria.
7. Even if the possibility of this land use does occur to local government officials before
the application for a permit, as it did in the three Indiana cases, this "advance notice" still does
the local government no good, under the courts' rulings, unless it is so far in advance that the
local government has time to create a comprehensive plan (if one does not exist already) and
enact a zoning ordinance.
8. Telephone Interview with Thomas A. Jensen, Attorney, McHale Cook & Welch,
Indianapolis (Oct. 3, 1995).
9. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Comprehensive Planning and Zoning
Section 601(a) of Title 36, Article 7, Chapter 4 of the Indiana Code states:
The legislative body having jurisdiction over the geographic area described
in the zoning ordinance has exclusive authority to adopt a zoning ordinance
under the 600 series. However, no zoning ordinance may be adopted until a
comprehensive plan has been approved for the jurisdiction under the 500
series of this chapter.'"
To understand this statute, it is first necessary to understand the basic land use
terms involved. A comprehensive plan is generally defined as an official public
document adopted by the local government as a policy guide to decisions about
the physical development of the community." The comprehensive plan sets forth,
in a general way, how the leaders of local government want the community to
develop in the future. 2 The plan is geographically and functionally
comprehensive." It covers all of the geographic area of the community and all
of the physical elements that determine future community development. A
comprehensive plan usually contains both textual policy and a map. The text
states the land use policies adopted by the plan. The map indicates where
development proposed by land use policies should occur. 4
The process of preparing a comprehensive plan begins with a survey and
analysis of the data that provide the basis for the plan's policies.' The plan
commission preparing the comprehensive plan performs research and analysis of
a wide range of present and projected physical, economic, and sociological
conditions of the municipality. 6 The second phase of the plan preparation
process is the setting of policies for the plan. The plan commission develops a
set of policies, goals, and objectives which make up the principal sections of the
comprehensive plan.' The third stage of the planning process is implementation
of the plan. 8 Implementation involves developing public support for the plan via
public hearings and other forms of citizen participation, 9 securing adoption of
10. IND. CODE § 36-7-4-601(a) (1993).
11. DONALD G. HAGMiAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSmEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 2.9 (2d ed. 1986).
12. Id.
13. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.01 (3d ed. 1993).
14. Id.
15. Id § 3.02.
16. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note II, § 2.10.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Indiana law requires the plan commission to give notice and hold one or more public
hearings on the plan before the plan commission can approve a comprehensive plan. The
commission must publish a schedule stating the time and place of each hearing, and the entire
plan must be on file and available for examination by the public for at least ten days before the
hearing. IND. CODE § 36-7-4-507 (1993).
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the plan, and action by the local legislative body to implement the policies and
objectives."
The tool with which the local government implements the policies and
objectives of the comprehensive plan is a zoning ordinance. The zoning
ordinance implements the policies and objectives of the comprehensive plan
through zoning regulations that create land use districts and specify the land uses
permitted in these districts.2 Zoning ordinances comprehensively designate
compatible land uses to zoning districts throughout the community.22 A zoning
ordinance contains a text and a map. The map designates the location of zoning
districts, and the text contains use, density, and site development regulations for
the land use permitted in each district, as well as administrative and enforcement
provisions."3 A zoning ordinance divides the municipality into a number of
zoning districts that separate residential, commercial, and industrial uses.24
The preparation for enacting a zoning ordinance is frequently a cumbersome
and time-consuming process.25 Thus, municipalities have often sought a means
whereby the status quo of an area being zoned may be temporarily retained so as
to prevent the establishment of uses and structures which would be inconsistent
with the proposed ordinance when ultimately adopted.26 The effectiveness of
comprehensive planning and zoning is undermined if land development proceeds
in an uncontrolled fashion during the planning and zoning process.2 Therefore,
interim or short-term development controls are needed to freeze or limit land use
activity while planning proceeds and until permanent controls implementing the
plan can be adopted.28 The adoption of a building permit or development
approval moratorium is an increasingly frequently used approach by local
governments to preserve the status quo until a new comprehensive plan or zoning
ordinance can be adopted and implemented.29 Over the years, many states have
passed specific statutes authorizing and regulating interim controls, but the
majority remain silent.0 Indiana belongs to this "silent majority."
20. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 11, § 2.10.
21. MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 3.01.
22. Id. § 1.03.
23. Id.
24. Id. In addition to going through the process of determining the substantive nature of the
zoning ordinance, a plan commission in Indiana must give notice and hold a public hearing
before the commission certifies a proposed zoning ordinance to the local legislative body. IND.
CODE §§ 36-7-4-602(a)(4), -604 (1993).
25. Michael J. Volpe, Comment, Stop-Gap and Interim Legislation, a Device to Maintain
the Status Quo of an Area Pending the Adoption of a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance or
Amendment Thereto, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 837, 837 (1967).
26. Id. at 837-38.
27. 3 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 22.01[l] (rev. 1996).
28. Id.
29. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 11, § 9.5.
30. 3 ROHAN, supra note 27, § 22.01[1].
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B. Factual Summaries of the Cases
The first case to deal with the moratoria issue was Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of
Commissioners.3 In 1989, Pro-Eco, Inc. prepared to purchase a farm in Jay
County, Indiana, and transform it into a sanitary landfill. 2 At this time, Jay
County did not have in force a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. When
the Board of Commissioners of Jay County learned of Pro-Eco's plans in early
1989, the Board held several meetings in February and March to discuss the
public's concern with landfills. As a result of these discussions, the Board
adopted an ordinance barring anyone from developing any property as a sanitary
landfill until the Board was able to enact a comprehensive land use plan. The
ordinance gave the Board three years to adopt such a plan.33
The ordinance also created an Area Land Use Management Committee and
empowered the Committee to study Jay County's need fof area-wide planning,
specifically focusing on sanitary landfills, and it allowed the Committee 180 days
to complete its task.34 The ordinance further recognized a nexus between the
public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Jay County and the
regulation, location, construction, and operation of public commercial sanitary
landfills. In addition, the Commissioners expressed a concern that the operation
of a sanitary landfill, prior to the adoption and implementation of proper
controls, might create serious irreversible environmental damage.35
Pro-Eco then sued the Board, alleging that the ordinance violated Indiana law
as well as several provisions of the United States Constitution. Both parties
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Pro-Eco's motion and
denied the Board's motion on the ground that the Board violated Indiana law in
enacting the ordinance.36 The district court found that the ordinance was a zoning
ordinance on the ground that it was "an attempt by the county to regulate the use
of a piece of property."37 The district court further held that because the Board
enacted the ordinance without first enacting, pursuant to statute, a comprehensive
plan, the Board had violated Indiana law.3" The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.39
31. 776 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 57 F.3d
505 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of further relief on subsequent appeal), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 672 (1995). All three of these cases (Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park) were in
federal court, as opposed to state court, because the plaintiffs in all three cases also alleged
violations of federal constitutional law provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, the
Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. In all three cases,
however, the courts decided the cases on state law grounds.
32. Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 635.
33. Id. at 636.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1368. The district court and the Seventh Circuit also used the
term "moratorium" to refer to the ordinance.
37. Id. at 1371.
38. Id
39. Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 636.
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The next case to deal with the moratoria issue was Triple G Landfills, Inc. v.
Board of Commissioners.4" In July 1989, Triple G Landfills, Inc. purchased an
option to buy a 189-acre tract in Fountain County, Indiana, on which it hoped to
build a sanitary landfill. At this time, Fountain County did not have in force a
comprehensive plan. When local residents learned of Triple G's plans, they were
"less than thrilled."4 ' On July 31, the Board of Commissioners of Fountain
County convened a special meeting to discuss Triple G's possible construction
of a landfill in Fountain County.42 Members of the public in attendance at the
meeting expressed concern about Triple G's plans. As a result of that concern,
the Commissioners took action to block Triple G. Over the next six months, they
enacted a series of measures designed to restrict landfill construction in the
county.43 The final measure, an ordinance, prohibited prospective landfill
operators from constructing or operating a landfill without a county permit, and
the ordinance imposed siting standards which effectively precluded Triple G
from developing a landfill in Fountain County."
Triple G sued the Board, seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance
was invalid under state law and the federal constitution, and a permanent
injunction against its enforcement.45 The district court granted summary
judgment to Triple G, on the ground that the ordinance violated Indiana Code
section 36-7-4-601(a),46 because the ordinance was "an attempt to zone in the
absence of a pre-existing comprehensive zoning plan. 4 ' The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.4"
The third case to deal with the issue of whether a moratorium is a zoning
ordinance was Sagamore Park v. City of Indianapolis.49 In 1989, the Indiana
General Assembly enacted Public Law 341-1989(ss) (the "Act"), thereby
creating the Indiana Horse Racing Commission ("IHRC") and authorizing pari-
mutuel wagering on horse races in Indiana.5" The Act also provides for the
establishment and licensing of satellite wagering facilities.5' On July 14, 1994,
40. 774 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ind. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
41. Triple G, 977 F.2d at 288.
42. Triple G, 774 F. Supp. at 529.
43. Triple G, 977 F.2d at 288.
44. Id. Although Fountain County, unlike Jay County, did not call its ordinance a
"moratorium," the Seventh Circuit held that it was effectively a moratorium on all landfill
development in Fountain County. ld at 292. This author agrees with the court's determination
that this regulation is effectively a moratorium and should therefore be treated as such.
However, this author disagrees with how the court decided to treat moratoria.
45. Triple G, 774 F. Supp. at 530.
46. See supra text accompanying note 10.
47. Triple G, 774 F. Supp. at 532. The district court also held that the ordinance was
preempted by state law, but the Seventh Circuit only addressed the issue on which this Note
speaks: whether the ordinance was a zoning ordinance. Triple G, 977 F.2d at 291.
48. Triple G, 977 F.2d at 288.
49. 885 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
50. IND. CODE § 4-31-1 (1993).
51. Id. § 4-31-5.5-1 (1993). Satellite wagering facilities are recreational facilities which
have a minimum seating capacity of 400 persons, receive and display on multiple screens
simulcast pari-mutuel horse races from live horse-racing facilities in Indiana and elsewhere,
[Vol. 72:809
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the IHRC issued Sagamore Park a license to own and operate a satellite wagering
facility at a location near the Lafayette Square shopping mall in Indianapolis.52
On May 23, 1994, however, the City-County Council had adopted a resolution
which established a ninety-day moratorium on the issuance of improvement
location permits ("ILPs") or zoning certifications for use of property for satellite
wagering facilities.53 The City-County Council also directed the Department of
Metropolitan Development ("DMD"), which has decision-making authority on
ILP applications, to work with the Council to propose amendments to the
Commercial Zoning Ordinance regarding satellite wagering facilities.54
Sagamore Park applied for an ILP on July 21, 1994." The DMD denied the
application the same day. Sagamore Park then brought suit, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the moratorium was invalid under state law and the federal
constitution. 6 The district court granted declaratory judgment to Sagamore Park,
on the ground that the moratorium was invalid because it was a zoning ordinance
which was not enacted as required by statute for zoning ordinances."
II. BENEFITS OF ALLOWING TEMPORARY MORATORIA58
There are several benefits to be derived from allowing municipalities to use
temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo while a municipality goes through
the comprehensive planning and zoning process. First, the ability to adopt a
temporary moratorium allows a municipality to respond effectively to surprises.
have full dining service available to all patrons, and display other sporting events on multiple
screens during those times when pari-mutuel horse races are not being broadcast. Patrons can
engage in pari-mutuel wagering at satellite facilities. Sagamore Park 885 F. Supp. at 1148.
Satellite wagering is often also referred to as "off-track betting."
52. Sagamore Park, 885 F. Supp. at 1148.
53. Id An improvement location permit is required prior to the alteration of any structure.
IND. CODE § 36-7-4-801(b) (1993); Improvement Location Permit.Ordinance of Marion
County, Indiana, City-County Council General Ordinance No. 134. The purpose of the ILP
requirement is to ensure that the new or renovated structure will comply with applicable zoning
regulations. Sagamore Park, 885 F. Supp. at 1149.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1150. A key difference between Sagamore Park and the two earlier cases, Pro-
Eco and Triple G, is that the municipality in Sagamore Park had a comprehensive plan. Thus,
Sagamore Park actually takes the courts' anti-moratoria doctrine a step further than the prior
two cases had, as it demonstrates that even having a comprehensive plan is not enough to save
a municipality from having its temporary moratorium crumpled up and thrown away by the
federal courts; the municipality has to follow all the steps laid out in the 600 series of Indiana
Code 36-7-4 to be left alone, not just the comprehensive planning part.
58. Webster's ThirdNew International Dictionary defines "moratorium" as "a suspension
of activity; a temporary ban on the use or production of something." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986).
Although the term "temporary moratorium" may therefore seem redundant, as the word
"temporary" is already included in the definition, this Note will nevertheless use these two
words together on occasion in order to make clear that the type of measure this Note is
supporting is of an interim, not permanent, nature.
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Without this ability, a town or county is "handcuffed" in dealing with new uses
of land that community leaders just had not contemplated. Under the courts'
rulings,5 9 Indiana counties cannot prevent a land use which they had not
legislated against before the developer applied for its permit. A community
should not, however, have to be burdened forever with an undesired land use just
because the local government did not have time to go through the lengthy process
of preparing and enacting a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance before the
developer applied for a permit. Also, a local government should have the ability
to respond quickly to an emergency situation involving the health, safety, or
welfare of its citizens. Allowing local governments to use temporary moratoria
gives them the ability to deal effectively with land uses they had not expected
and thus protect the interests of their citizens.
Second, the use of temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo during the
planning and zoning process can protect the effectiveness of the subsequently-
enacted zoning ordinance. The ultimate effectiveness of planning is undermined
if land development proceeds in an uncontrolled fashion during the planning
period.6' A moratorium on development activity protects the planning process by
deterring the establishment of uses that would or might be inconsistent with
needs ultimately identified by planning studies.6' Thus, local governments can
use temporary moratoria to ensure that the effectiveness of the planning and
zoning is not destroyed before it is implemented.
Third, a temporary moratorium provides an opportunity for increased public
participation and debate.62 A moratorium can allow time for public debate on the
issues, goals, and policies of planning, and the zoning ordinances proposed to
implement the plans. The planning process can thus be brought out into the open
for full democratic debate and citizen participation, thereby assuring a greater
relationship between the laws and planning policies and the real goals and needs
of the people.63 Open public discussion of proposed zoning ordinances should
help to eliminate costly errors and the possibility of meeting a hostile or
indifferent public attitude which jeopardizes adoption and implementation 6f the
plan.64
Fourth, the ability to use temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo
eliminates the incentive for hasty planning. If a municipality does not have the
power to enact a temporary moratorium on development, it may enact restrictive
permanent controls in the shortest time possible to limit the number of
intervening uses that might not conform to the new planning scheme.65 This hasty
process decreases the chances for a thorough public airing of proposed
59. The phrase "the courts' rulings," when used in this Note, refers to the decisions of the
federal courts in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park
60. 3 ROHAN, supra note 27, § 22.01 [1].
61. Id. Under the law of nonconforming uses, those uses that preexist changes in the law
are permitted to continue. Id. § 22.01[1] n.2.
62. Id. § 22.0111].
63. Robert H. Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URB. L. 65, 66 (1971).
64. Id. at 95.
65. 3 ROHAN, supra note 27, § 22.01[1].
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legislation.' Temporary moratoria can eliminate the need for hasty adoption of
permanent controls in order to avoid the establishment of nonconforming uses
and structures.67 Because the local government has the ability to preserve the
status quo, there is no reason to hurry through the planning process.
Fifth, the use of temporary moratoria can prevent the activity that the courts
have characterized as a "race for diligence."6 Public knowledge that the local
government has made, or is about to make, studies to alter existing land use
controls frequently triggers development activity that may frustrate planning
efforts.69 Developers race to acquire building permits and beat the enactment of
a new zoning ordinance which, they fear, will be more restrictive than the current
controls. ° This "race for diligence" is neither in the best interest of the
community nor individual property owners!' This problem also ties in with the
problems of hasty planning and lack of public discussion, as the threat of
developers racing to beat the zoning ordinance gives incentive to local
governments to plan hastily and secretly. The use of temporary moratoria can
eliminate the "race for diligence" threat and thereby allow local governments to
plan thoroughly and openly.
Sixth, the ability of municipalities to use temporary moratoria would take away
the incentive developers now have, due to the courts' rulings, to look for counties
that do not have a comprehensive plan and take advantage of them. If counties
are able to protect themselves temporarily despite their lack of a comprehensive
plan, then developers will have no incentive to select a county due to its lack of
a comprehensive plan. One possible counterargument to this is that the risk of
such an occurrence is what gives counties incentive to plan. However, this risk
works as an effective incentive only if the risk is realized by those who are
intended to be "motivated" and soon enough to make a difference. It is doubtful
that this is very often the situation; if the counties in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and
Sagamore Park, for example, had considered that a landfill or off-track betting
facility might be put in their communities, they likely would have gone through
the steps specified by Indiana statute to make sure they were completely safe.
The local governments in these three cases, however, did not realize the risk of
undesired development in their communities until it was too late to prevent the
undesired land use by enacting a zoning ordinance.
There are, of course, arguments against allowing municipalities to use
temporary moratoriaO One such argument is that municipalities with the ability
to use temporary moratoria may "abuse the privilege" and just use moratoria to
accomplish their land use objectives instead of going through the time-
consuming procedures for enacting comprehensive plans and zoning
66. Id.
67. Freilich, supra note 63, at 66.
68. Volpe, supra note 25, at 839.
69. 3 ROHAN, supra note 27, § 22.01 [1].
70. Id.; see also Volpe, supra note 25, at 838.
71. Volpe, supra note 25, at 839.
72. If there were not any arguments against allowing temporary moratoria, it would seem
likely thatthe courts would not have struck them down in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore
Park.
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ordinances.73 While this is probably the strongest argument against allowing the
use of temporary moratoria, it is refutable. First, the type of temporary moratoria
this Note supports could not be used by municipalities perpetually. The
moratorium would exist only long enough to allow the municipality to enact a
comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. Second, landowners can still protect
themselves against unreasonable government activity via other claims, such as
the ones the plaintiffs in the three main cases brought.74 These other federal and
state protections against government intrusion on private land use should be
enough to preserve the balance between the property owner's ability to use his
property as he desires and the public's ability to effectively maintain community
standards.
Another possible argument, already mentioned above, against moratoria is that
not allowing them created incentives for counties to do a comprehensive plan.75
The reasoning is that if local governments know that without a comprehensive
plan they are powerless to prohibit an undesired land use, they will be scared into
preparing and enacting a comprehensive plan. However, while prohibiting the
use of temporary moratoria may provide incentive for local governments to plan,
it also provides incentive for them to plan hastily and secretly. Thus, as discussed
above, we still need temporary moratoria in order to allow local governments to
plan thoroughly and openly.
Also, in some situations this incentive to plan may be an incentive for
inefficient behavior by the local government, as there may be no other reason for
the local government to do a comprehensive plan. For example, due to counties'
current inability to keep out an undesired land use if they do not have a
comprehensive plan, a landfill developer may select a particular county as a
landfill site due to the county's lack of a comprehensive plan. By selecting a
county which has no comprehensive plan, the developer can eliminate the risk of
having its venture foiled by a local government's rejection of the landfill.
However, outside of this benefit the developer receives by locating in this
county, there may be no reason to put a landfill in this county. In other words, it
may be that this county is an inefficient place for a landfill, so no one would
want to put a landfill there except for the fact that the county has no
comprehensive plan. In this way, refusing to allow counties to use temporary
moratoria to protect themselves against undesired land uses can lead to
inefficient placement of particular land uses. Also, because a county must go
73. The Seventh Circuit adopted this argument in Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 638.
74. The plaintiffs in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park alleged violations of the
Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Commerce Clause, as well as that the defendants' moratoria were preempted
by state law. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1368; Triple G, 774 F. Supp. at 530; Sagamore Park,
885 F. Supp. at 1149. A landowner can argue that a regulation or control as applied to his land
is a taking of property because it does not allow him a reasonable use of his land. MANDELKER,
supra note 13, § 1.03. The courts will also strike down interim controls that clearly serve
improper regulatory purposes. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW § 6.07 (2d ed. 1988).
Morales v. Haines, 349 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. II. 1972), held, for example, that a one-year
suspension of building permits for subsidized housing was an equal protection violation.
75. See supra text accompanying note 72 for initial discussion of this argument.
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through the comprehensive planning process in order to avoid being selected by
a developer much as a lion selects a gazelle, the county has an incentive to create
a comprehensive plan, even though there might not be any other reason for the
county to do a plan at this time. Because comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances cost time and money to enact, this incentive to go through the
planning process and incur these costs prematurely76 is an incentive for
inefficient behavior.
Another answer to the incentive-to-plan argument against moratoria is that,
according to Sagamore Park, just having a comprehensive plan is not enough,
anyway.77 The moratorium, to be valid, has to satisfy all the requirements of a
zoning ordinance.78 Thus, just having a comprehensive plan would not have
saved the counties in Pro-Eco and Triple G. To be protected, the local
governments must foresee every undesirable land use which may arise in the
future and enact a zoning ordinance against every one of these uses before
someone applies for a permit for one of these uses. The current law, as a result
of the courts' rulings, thus requires much more of Indiana municipalities than
that they just prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan.
One other reason that some courts and legislatures are less than enthusiastic
about allowing local governments to use moratoria is that during the early years
of zoning an inadequate understanding of how municipalities should use
moratoria gave moratoria a bad name and thereby hampered their development.79
The early "interim ordinance'8 0 was not a truly temporary control designed to
protect the planning process until the adoption of a permanent ordinance, but a
permanent, hasty control usually designed to avoid comprehensive planning.8
This is not, however, the type of interim control this Note supports. A
moratorium should be temporary, and it should only be in effect long enough to
achieve its purpose, which is to preserve the status quo while the local
government goes diligently through the planning and zoning process as required
by statute. In Alm quist v. Town ofMarshan,2 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
stated that a moratorium on the issuance of land use permits will be valid if: (1)
it is adopted by the local government in good faith, (2) it is not discriminatory,
76. The planning is premature, and thus inefficient, if the costs of creating a comprehensive
plan at this time outweigh the benefits of having a plan. In making this determination of
whether costs or benefits are greater, one should not include in the "benefit" category the fact
that having a comprehensive plan will protect the county from being selected by a developer
due to lack of a comprehensive plan. Whether this incentive to plan is good or bad depends on
whether there are sufficient reasons to plan other than the reason provided by the incentive
itself.
77. See supra note 57.
78. The requirements are listed in the 600 series of Indiana Code 36-7-4. See also supra
note 24.
79. See Freilich, supra note 63, at 80.
80. The term "interim ordinance" refers to moratoria and other temporary land use controls.
81. Freilich, supra note 63, at 80.
82. 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976).
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(3) it is of limited duration,13 (4) it is for the purpose of the development of a
comprehensive zoning plan, and (5) the local government acts promptly to adopt
such a plan.84 Requiring a moratorium to satisfy these standards will prevent
municipalities from using moratoria improperly.
III. WHY A TEMPQRARY MORATORIUM Is NOT A ZONING
ORDINANCE
The courts in Pro-Eco, Tiiple G, and Sagamore Park based their decisions to
invalidate the municipalities' moratoria on their conclusion that the moratoria
were zoning ordinances, which were therefore invalid because they were not
enacted according to the steps required by statute for zoning ordinances. The
key issue in each case was whether the moratorium was a zoning ordinance. The
courts' basic reason for deciding that the moratorium in each case was a zoning
ordinance was that the moratorium regulated land use,86 so therefore it must be
zoning. However, the authorities which have defined "zoning" are quite clear that
zoning involves more than just regulating land, and the authorities are also quite
consistent in their definitions.
There are no controlling precedents in the decisions of the Indiana state courts
on the issue of whether a temporary moratorium used by a local government to
preserve the status quo pending the adoption of a comprehensive plan or zoning
ordinance is a zoning ordinance and therefore subject to the 600 series of Indiana
Code 36-7-4.7 In K.G. Horton & Sons v. Board of Zoning Appeals,8 the Indiana
Supreme Court held that an attempt by the county commissioners of Madison
County to extend, for the ninth time, a one-year "interim" zoning ordinance was
beyond the board's power and void. Horton's holding, though, is inapplicable to
the issue of whether a temporary moratorium is valid. The most important
distinction between Horton and the issue in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore
Park is that the ordinance challenged in Horton was not a temporary moratorium
used to preserve the status quo pending the adoption of a comprehensive plan or
83. The length of time a moratorium should last will vary with the needs of the community
in each particular case. Courts in other states have invalidated four- and five-year freezes, but
courts have generally upheld periods of three years or less. 3 ROHAN, supra note 27, §
22.02[2].
84. Almquist, 245 N.W.2d at 826. One modification which would improve the Almquist
five-part test is that the "purpose" requirement (part four) should also include the enactment
of a zoning ordinance. Including the enactment of a zoning ordinance as a permissible purpose
for a moratorium would allow a municipality which already has a comprehensive plan, such
as the defendant in Sagamore Park, to use a moratorium to protect the effectiveness of a
subsequent zoning ordinance.
85. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. 1368; Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d 635; Triple G, 774 F. Supp. 528;
Triple G, 977 F.2d 287; Sagamore Park, 885 F. Supp. 1146.
86. The moratorium in each case "regulated" land use by prohibiting a particular use.
Indiana Code § 36-1-2-15 defines "regulate" as "license, inspect, or prohibit."
87. The 600 series of Indiana Code 36-7-4 provides the requirements with which zoning
ordinances must comply.
88. 135 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1956).
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zoning ordinance. The ordinance in Horton really was "zoning." 9 The Indiana
Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether a county has the authority
to adopt a temporary moratorium designed to preserve the status quo pending
adoption of a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. Because the Indiana
courts have not answered the question of whether such a temporary moratorium
is a zoning ordinance subject to Indiana Code section 36-7-4-601(a)" and the rest
of the 600 series, we must look to other authority to determine the proper
definition of "zoning."
Indiana's zoning statute defines "zoning ordinance" as "an ordinance adopted
under the 600 series of [Indiana Code] 36-7-4 or under prior law."'" Because the
moratoria used by the municipalities in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park
were not adopted, nor intended to be adopted, under the complex provisions that
provide for classification by district included in the 600 series of Indiana Code
36-7-4, these moratoria fall outside the statutory definition of "zoning
ordinance."
The Indiana Law Encyclopedia's definition of "zoning," which the courts cite
in all three cases, is "the regulation by districts of the building development and
uses of property, and its essence is a territorial division according to the
character of land and structures and their peculiar suitability for particular uses
and the uniformity of use within the division."' The moratoria used by the local
governments in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park, however, neither
regulated by districts nor divided territory according to its suitability for
particular uses. Thus, what these municipalities were doing does not fall under
the Indiana Law Encyclopedia definition, which the courts cite, strangely
enough, to support their decisions.
Another authority defines "zoning" as:
the division of a municipality or other local community into districts, and the
regulation of buildings and structures according to their construction and the
nature and extent of their use, or the regulation of land according to its nature
and uses. It is a legislative act representing a legislative judgment as to how
the land within a community should be utilized and where the lines of
demarcation between the several use zones should be drawn, which is very
precise and legally restricts present or immediate land use. The very essence
of zoning is the territorial division of land into use districts according to the
character of the land and buildings, the suitability of land and buildings for
particular uses, and uniformity of use.93
Once again, the moratoria in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park did not
divide their municipalities into districts, draw "lines of demarcation" between
use zones, or divide any territory according to its character. Thus, this authority's
89. The ordinance involved a "rezoning" of real estate from residential to business uses for
the proposed establishment of a wholesale grocery warehouse. Id. at 244. Thus, the ordinance
classified property and regulated it by district, which is what "zoning" is. See infra text
accompanying notes 92-95.
90. See supra text accompanying note 10.
91. IND. CODE § 36-7-1-22 (1993).
92. 30 IND. L. ENCYCLOPEDIA Zoning § 1, 635 (1960) (emphasis added).
93. 83 AM. JuR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 2 (1992) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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definition of "zoning" does not fit what these local governments were doing,
either.
Yet another authority defines "zoning" as "the separation of a municipality into
districts or 'zones' and the regulation of each district as to the structure, nature
and use of its buildings and land."94 A common thread running throughout these
definitions seems to be that "zoning" is the classification and regulation of land
by district. As pointed out above, two of these necessary elements of zoning
("classification" and "by district") were not present in the moratoria adopted by
the local governments in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also been consistent in defining the term
"zoning." In City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder,95 the court defined zoning as
"[t]he division of a city by legislative regulation into districts and the
prescription and application in each district of regulations having to do with
structural and architectural designs of buildings and of regulations prescribing
use to which buildings within designated districts may be put."96 The court in De
Benedetti v. River Vale Township97 defined zoning as "territorial division
according to the character of the lands and structures and their peculiar
suitability for particular uses, among other considerations, and uniformity of use
within the division."98 The Supreme Court of Maine, in Fisher v. Dame," defined
zoning as "the division of a municipality into districts and the prescription and
reasonable application of different regulations in each district."' 00
A common aspect to all of these definitions is that "zoning" is the division of
land and the prescription of uses for the separate parcels of land. ' Courts have
used this standard definition of "zoning" to determine that municipal ordinances
that regulate operations concerning land, rather than legislate particular uses of
land according to defined districts, are not zoning ordinances.'0 2 The courts'
decisions in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park, in determining that the
94. 6 ROHAN, supra note 27, § 37.01 [1]. This definition, too, is cited by the Seventh Circuit
in Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 638.
95. 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963).
96. Id. at 572 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1793 (4th ed. 1957)).
97. 91 A.2d 353 (N.J. App. 1952).
98. Id. at 355 (quoting Collins v. Board'of Adjustment, 69 A.2d 708, 710 (N.J. 1949)).
99. 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
100. Id. at 372 n.9 (quoting Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48 (Me. 1981)).
101. See also Proffett v. Valley View Village, 123 F. Supp. 339, 343 (N.D. Ohio 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Karp v. Zoning Bd., 240 A.2d 845, 850
(Conn. 1968); Stephans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 397 A.2d 289, 292 (Md. App. 1979),
aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 408 A.2d 1017 (Md. 1979);" 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land
Planning § 2 (1979); 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1. 13
(4th ed. 1996).
102. In Barefield v. Davis, 251 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), the court said that
a resolution by the board of county commissioners prohibiting additional mobile home parks
in a particular area and providing for extension of existing mobile home parks in this area only
by a board-issued permit was not a zoning ordinance and was not governed by any general law
of municipal zoning. In City ofAstoria v. Nothwang, 351 P.2d 688, 691 (Or. 1960), the court
said that an ordinance relating to the parking of trailer houses, auto homes, and camp cars was
not a zoning ordinance where its primary purpose was to promote public health, safety, and
sanitation by forbidding the use of parked vehicles as living quarters.
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moratoria those municipalities used were "zoning," were inconsistent with other
courts' definitions of "zoning."
In Schafer v. City of New Orleans, 3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
a city ordinance which prohibited the issuance of building permits for fast-food
restaurants in a particular neighborhood until the city could complete a study of
the area. In addition to holding for the city on the federal constitutional issues,
T
0
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the moratorium was not
a zoning ordinance and therefore did not need to conform to Louisiana's
constitutional and statutory provisions for the adoption of zoning ordinances.'
The Fifth Circuit also recognized that "[i]nterim development controls such as
this moratorium have been found to play an important role in municipal
planning" and that "[t]hey may, as here, be used to preserve the status quo while
study of the area and its needs is completed."' 6 Because studies of and changes
in land use control "cannot be completed instanter ... a moratorium may be
necessary to prevent a plan's defeat before it is formulated."' 7
The district court in Pro-Eco distinguished Schafer on the grounds that, unlike
Jay County, the City of New Orleans had a comprehensive zoning ordinance,'0 8
and that New Orleans "was not operating under the specific language of the
Indiana statute."'" 9 However, the fact that New Orleans had a comprehensive
zoning ordinance is not a "critical difference" from the situation in Pro-Eco,
because New Orleans's comprehensive zoning ordinance conflicted with the
city's moratorium."0 Because the Schafer court upheld the moratorium despite
the direct conflict between the moratorium and the comprehensive zoning
ordinance, and because the court did not otherwise comment on the importance
of the comprehensive zoning ordinance's existence, it is reasonable to infer that
the comprehensive zoning ordinance's existence was not crucial to the court's
holding in Schafer. The Pro-Eco court's distinguishing of Schafer on the grounds
that Louisiana did not have Indiana's specific statutory language is also not
persuasive, as the statutory language cited in Schafer"' would have invalidated
the moratorium if the statute were applicable, but the Schafer court said the
statute did not apply. The Fifth Circuit's treatment of New Orleans's moratorium
in Schafer is a good example of how courts should treat temporary moratoria
enacted to preserve the status quo while the local government goes through the
planning and zoning process.
103. 743 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1984).
104. The Fifth Circuit held that the city's action did not deprive landowners of due process
or deny them equal protection. Id. at 1090.
105. Id at 1087.
106. Id at 1090.
107. Id.
108. The court called this the "critical difference." Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1372.
109. Id.
110. In 1970, the city adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance permitting the landowners'
property in the particular area at issue and other property in the same area to be used for a
variety of commercial purposes, including operation of fast-food restaurants. Schafer, 743 F.2d
at 1087-88. In 1984, the city adopted the moratorium at issue, which prohibited the issuance
of building permits for fast-food restaurants in this area. Id. at 1088.
111. See id. at 1089 nn.l-2.
1997]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The courts' opinions in the three cases place a great deal of weight on the fact
that a moratorium and a zoning ordinance share a common objective: regulating
the use of land. Having an objective in common, though, does not make two
things the same thing. For example, a quarterback and an offensive lineman on
a football team have the same "essential object""' 2 of scoring touchdowns, but
they are nevertheless two different players with two very different roles."' Just
as these two football players have a common objective and yet separate identities
and roles, so do a moratorium and zoning ordinance have separate identities and
roles.
On a related note, the courts in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park also
incorrectly treat the terms "zoning" and "regulating" as if they were synonymous.
The courts' decisions establish that any ordinance which regulates the use of a
piece of property is an act of zoning."' This is a poor rule, because "regulating"
and "zoning" are not synonymous. While all zoning necessarily involves
regulation, not all regulation involves zoning. Regulation is just one element of
zoning. Zoning is the classification and regulation of land by districts.
The courts in Pro-Eco and Triple G, however, argue that regulation by districts
is not a necessary element of zoning." 5 According to the district court in Pro-
Eco, "[t]o say, as does the County, that this ordinance is not a zoning ordinance
because it does not purport to regulate the county by districts is to ignore the
general notion that an object of zoning is to regulate the use of land."".6
However, to say that a moratorium is not a zoning ordinance because it does not
regulate the county by districts is not, contrary to the district court's argument,
to ignore the "general notion" that an object of zoning is to regulate the use of
land; rather, it is simply to not make this "general notion" dispositive. In other
words, that an object of zoning is to regulate the use of land does not mean that
the definition of zoning does not also require that the regulation be by districts.
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the "by districts" requirement in Pro-Eco by
saying that a regulation which was enacted after a comprehensive plan and which
did what Jay County's moratorium did would "certainly" be a zoning ordinance,
so therefore the court could not agree that a zoning ordinance must regulate a
county by districts."" The court, however, did not explain why an ordinance
which does what Jay County's moratorium did and which is enacted after a
112. These words come from the Indiana Law Encyclopedia definition of "zoning," which
the courts cite in all three cases. 30 IND. L. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 92, § 1, at 635.
113. Interestingly enough, the use of these two particular football positions, quarterback and
offensive lineman, allows a further analogical comparison between football and land use. Just
as an offensive lineman protects the quarterback and gives him time to do his job, a temporary
moratorium protects a pending zoning ordinance from having its purpose frustrated while it is
in the process of being enacted. Thus, the moratorium allows the zoning ordinance to "do its
job."
114. Sagamore Park, 885 F. Supp. at 1150.
115. See Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1371; Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 638; Triple G, 774 F. Supp.
at 532-33; Triple G, 977 F.2d at 291.
116. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1371.
117. Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 638.
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comprehensive plan would "certainly" be a zoning ordinance. The court did not
explain why a zoning ordinance does not have to regulate a county by districts.
In Triple G, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the "by districts" requirement on the
basis that Indiana has a statute"' which gives zoning bodies the authority to
"establish one or more districts.""' 9 The court went on to say that "[a]ccordingly,
Indiana law clearly recognizes that an ordinance can be a zoning ordinance even
if it creates only a single district."'20 However, the court failed to explain how the
Fountain County ordinance establishes or creates a district. Indiana Code section
36-7-4-601 (d)(1) does not say that an ordinance which does not actually create,
or "mark off," a district or districts may nevertheless be a zoning ordinance; the
statute merely says that a zoning ordinance may mark off only one district-that
is, the ordinance does not have to mark off more than one.
The courts' rule that any ordinance which constitutes an attempt to regulate the
use of a piece of property is an act of zoning is vastly overbroad. This definition
of zoning, along with the requirement that zoning ordinances must be enacted
according to the steps laid out in the 600 series of Indiana Code 36-7-4 and only
after a comprehensive plan is enacted, drastically diminishes a local
government's ability to enact and enforce ordinances on any subject which
conceivably could touch upon the use of land.' The local government is left
powerless to respond quickly to an emergency situation involving the health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens, as it must enact a comprehensive plan before it
does anything, and even if the municipality already has a comprehensive plan,
the local government must still go through the time-consuming steps required by
statute for enacting a zoning ordinance before it can take action.
The moratoria used by the local governments in Pro-Eco, Triple G, and
Sagamore Park were not zoning ordinances, they were permitting ordinances.
They did not divide the county into districts or classify the county's districts and
prescribe proper land uses for each district. They simply were designed to
preserve the status quo to allow the local governments the time and opportunity
to go through the statutorily required planning and zoning process. Unless courts
recognize this distinction between temporary moratoria and zoning ordinances,
the courts will continue to unnecessarily frustrate the effectiveness of the
planning and zoning process.
IV. AUTHORITY TO ENACT A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM
Because a temporary moratorium is not a zoning ordinance, Indiana's Home
Rule Act 2 2 provides municipalities with the authority to enact temporary
moratoria. The Home Rule provision of Indiana Code 36-1-3-3(b) provides that
118. IND. CODE § 36-7-4-601(d)(1) (1993).
119. Triple G, 977 F.2d at 291.
120. Id.
121. For example, under the courts' definition of zoning, municipalities could be prohibited
from enacting ordinances preventing parking on certain streets, because such ordinances would
"regulate the use of a piece of property." Brief and Appendix of Appellants at 27, Triple G
Landfills, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 977 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3507).
122. IND. CODE §§ 36-1-3-1 to -9 (1993).
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any doubt as to the existence of a power of local government is to be resolved in
favor of its existence.'23 The Home Rule Act also states that a local government
has "[a]ll ... powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs, even
though not granted by statute."'24 The limitation on this power is that a local
government cannot exercise a power that is "expressly denied by the Indiana
Constitution or by statute" or "expressly granted to another entity."'2 5 Also, if
there is a "constitutional or statutory provision requiring a specific manner for
exercising a power," a local government exercising this power "must do so in
that manner."'26
The district court in Pro-Eco ruled that the Home Rule Act did not apply to the
temporary moratorium which Jay County issued, on the grounds that there was
a statutory provision requiring a specific manner for exercising this power and
Jay County failed to exercise the power in that manner. 27 The court reasoned that
because Indiana Code section 36-7-4-601(a)' requires a local government to
adopt a comprehensive plan before adopting a zoning ordinance, and because Jay
County did not adopt a comprehensive plan before enacting its moratorium, Jay
County failed to exercise its power in the manner required by statute. Thus, there
was "no doubt to resolve" under Indiana Code section 36-1-3-3(b), so the Home
Rule Act did not apply.'29
The court reached this result, however, only because the court first determined
that the moratorium was a zoning ordinance. As the court recognized, "[i]f [the
moratorium] is not a zoning ordinance the inquiry is over."'30 In other words, the
court's argument that the Home Rule Act does not provide a local government
the authority to enact a temporary moratorium is correct only if a moratorium
such as Jay County's is a zoning ordinance. If a moratorium is not a zoning
ordinance, then its enactment without prior adoption of a comprehensive plan
does not violate any "statutory provision requiring a specific manner for
exercising a power." Because a temporary moratorium enacted to preserve the
status quo during the planning and zoning process is not a zoning ordinance, the
Home Rule Act provides local governments with the authority to enact such a
moratorium.
V. FIRST ENGLISH
The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation."'' Thus, if a government
action constitutes a "taking" of private property, then the government must
123. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1371.
124. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-4(b)(2) (1993).
125. Id. § 36-1-3-5(a) (1993).
126. Id. § 36-1-3-6(a) (1993).
127. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1372. The Seventh Circuit also held that the Home Rule Act
did not apply to the moratorium issued by Jay County. Pro-Eco, 956 F.2d at 639.
128. See supra text accompanying note 10.
129. Pro-Eco, 776 F. Supp. at 1372.
130. Id. at 1371.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compensate the property owner for the property owner's loss. Before 1987,
courts had applied this compensation requirement to government condemnations
of private property in the exercise of the power of eminent domain and to
regulations which permanently denied a landowner all use of his land. In First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles, '32 however, the
Supreme Court held that the compensation requirement can also apply to
temporary regulations.' The Court held that if a particular ordinance would be
a taking if it were permanent, then it is a taking even though it is temporary, and
therefore the government must compensate the landowner for the temporary loss
of his property.'34 Thus, First English created a potential obstacle for local
governments desiring to use temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo
during the zoning process. Most temporary moratoria, however, will be able to
clear this obstacle and thus avoid triggering the compensation requirement of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's holding in First English is limited to situations in which
a regulation denies a landowner "all use" of his property.'35 Thus, the First
English requirement of compensation for temporary takings does not apply to a
temporary moratorium which does not deny all use of the land. Most land use
regulations do not deny all use of a landowner's property. 3 6 An ordinance
enacting a temporary moratorium can easily be designed so that it does not block
all reasonable use of land.' By allowing some use of land, either on the face of
the ordinance or by administrative relief provision, a temporary moratorium will
be able to stay clear of First English's compensation requirement.
Furthermore, a temporary moratorium which does deny all use of the land is
most likely still immune from the compensation requirement if the temporary
moratorium is of short duration (less than one year). In First English, the Court
stated that its decision does not apply to "the case of normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like."'38 A
temporary moratorium which denies reasonable use of property seems properly
characterized as a "normal delay" incident to the zoning process where the
moratorium is of relatively short duration, closely tied to, and enacted in support
of, a proposed zoning plan or zoning change.' In such situations, the temporary
132. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
133. Id. at 318. In First English, a flood destroyed a church's campground buildings. In
response to the flood, Los Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the
construction or reconstruction of any building or structure in an interim flood protection area
that included the land on which the church's buildings had stood. Shortly after the ordinance
was adopted, the church sued the county, alleging that the ordinance denied the church all use
of its property and seeking to recover monetary damages for this loss of use. Id. at 304.
134. Id. at 318, 322.
135. See id. at 318, 321, 322.
136. MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 8.25.
137. Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Interim Zoning and Building Moratoria: Temporary Taking
Claims After First English, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L. RE'. 97, 102 (1989).
138. First English, 482 U.S. at 321. The Court also stated, in prefacing its holding, that
"[h]ere we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordinance has denied appellant all use
of its propertyfor a considerable period ofyears." Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
139. Ziegler, supra note 137, at 99.
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moratorium would have the effect of simply delaying issuance of a building
permit pending the effective date of a proposed comprehensive plan or zoning
ordinance.'40 This delay may be viewed as simply action incidental to the normal
zoning process. 4 ' In a post-First English case, S.E. W. Friel v. Triangle Oil
Co., '4 the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a nine-
month moratorium enacted in support of a comprehensive revision of the
county's comprehensive plan which prohibited, except by special exemption,
building permits for all development within the county. Because the plaintiff had
not sought monetary damages, the court did not directly rule on the temporary
taking claim, but the court did indicate its support for characterization of the
temporary moratorium as a normal delay incident to the zoning process. 4 '
Because the Court limited its holding in First English to regulations which deny
"all use" of the land and because the Court also exempted "normal delays," a
municipality enacting a temporary moratorium can avoid the compensation
requirement simply by allowing some reasonable use of land or by limiting the
duration of the moratorium to less than a year.
CONCLUSION
The courts should allow local governments to use temporary moratoria to
preserve the status quo while the local government goes through the process of
enacting a comprehensive plan or a zoning ordinance. There are many benefits
to be derived from allowing municipalities to use temporary moratoria in this
manner. First, the ability to adopt a temporary moratorium allows a municipality
to respond effectively to surprises and thus avoid being "handcuffed" in dealing
with new uses of land that community leaders just had not contemplated. Second,
the use of temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo during the planning and
zoning process can protect the effectiveness of the subsequently-enacted zoning
ordinance. Third, a temporary moratorium provides an opportunity for increased
public participation and debate. Fourth, the ability to use temporary moratoria to
preserve the status quo eliminates the incentive for hasty planning. Fifth, the use
of temporary moratoria can prevent the "race for diligence." Sixth, the ability of
municipalities to use temporary moratoria would take away the incentive
developers now have, due to the courts' rulings, to look for counties that do not
have a comprehensive plan and take advantage of them.
A temporary moratorium is not a zoning ordinance. Although the courts in Pro-
Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park decided that the moratorium in each case was
a zoning ordinance because the moratorium regulated land use, other authorities
which have defined zoning are quite clear that zoning involves more than just
regulating land. Regulation is just one element of zoning. Zoning is the
classification and regulation of land by districts. A temporary moratorium is
significantly different from a zoning ordinance and can, if used properly,
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 543 A.2d 863 (Md. App. 1988).
143. Ziegler, supra note 137, at 100.
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complement a zoning ordinance very well. The Home Rule statute provides
Indiana municipalities with the authority to enact temporary moratoria to
preserve the status quo during the planning and zoning process, and planners can
easily avoid the compensation requirement of First English by simply not
prohibiting all land use.
Allowing municipalities to use temporary moratoria to preserve the status quo
is good public policy. Until Pro-Eco, Triple G, and Sagamore Park, temporary
moratoria were also clearly allowable as a matter of law. Unless the courts
recognize the public benefits of using temporary moratoria and the legal
differences between a temporary moratorium and a zoning ordinance, the courts
will continue to unnecessarily hinder the effectiveness of the planning and
zoning process.

